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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 10-3829
_____________
JANET L. EVANS; ROBERT A. COPLIN;
ANNETTE BARRY-SMITH; ROCHELLE JOYNER;
RONALD SMITH; BONNIE L. FORD;
NEIL SKELTON; JUDITH A. SAMUEL
v.
PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY,
its employees, agents, and/or servants
Janet L. Evans; Robert A. Coplin, Appellants
_____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
District Court No. 2-06-cv-03239
District Judge: The Honorable Garrett E. Brown, Jr.
_____________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
July 11, 2011
Before: RENDELL, SMITH, and FISHER, Circuit Judges
(Filed: July 21, 2011)
_____________________
OPINION
_____________________
1

SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Janet Evans and Robert A. Coplin appeal from an order of the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey, which granted the motion for
summary judgment filed by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. 1 For
the reasons set forth below, we will affirm.
Evans and Coplin sued their employer, the Port Authority, asserting several
causes of action alleging that the Port Authority had discriminated against them on
the basis of race in failing to promote them. 2 The Port Authority succeeded in
moving for the dismissal of several claims. After the close of discovery, the Port
Authority filed a motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims of race
discrimination under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Evans, and of racial
discrimination under § 1983 by Coplin. The District Court appropriately applied
the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework. 3 The Court concluded that

1

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. We exercise
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because the Notice of Appeal specifically states
that the appeal is from the District Court’s grant of summary judgment, we decline to
review any of the earlier rulings in this case. See Sulima v. Tobyhanna Army Depot, 602
F.3d 177, 184 (3d Cir. 2010) (observing that “[i]f an appeal is taken only from a specified
judgment, the court does not acquire jurisdiction to review other judgments not specified
or ‘fairly inferred’ by the Notice”).
2
Evans and Coplin are two of seven plaintiffs from the District Court proceeding. The
other five chose not to participate in this appeal. Accordingly, we limit our discussion to
the facts bearing on the contentions of error raised by Evans and Coplin.
3
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). This
framework, as the District Court properly noted, also applies to claims of racial
2

neither Evans nor Coplin had demonstrated a prima facie case of discrimination.
In addition, the Court determined that the Port Authority had proffered legitimate,
non-discriminatory reasons for its failure to promote Evans and Coplin and that
neither had shown that these reasons were pretextual.
On appeal, Evans and Coplin contend that the District Court erred in
granting summary judgment because it made credibility determinations.
review of a court’s grant of summary judgment is plenary.

Our

Doe v. C.A.R.S.

Protection Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 2008).
Evans contends that the District Court erred in determining that she failed to
demonstrate, as part of her prima facie case, that she was qualified for the position
of Director of Government and Community Affairs. In her view, the Court erred
because it made its own judgment as to her qualifications. The Court explained,
however, that Evans failed to provide any evidence regarding the experience,
knowledge, and skills required for the position. Nothing in our review provides a
basis for concluding otherwise. Furthermore, Evans has not directed us to any
evidence of record that refutes the District Court’s determination. Because Evans
failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination under either Title VII or
§ 1983, we conclude that the District Court did not err by granting the Port

discrimination asserted under § 1983. Stewart v. Rutgers, 120 F.3d 426, 432 (3d Cir.
1997).
3

Authority’s motion for summary judgment.
The District Court also determined that Coplin failed to demonstrate the
prima facie element that he was qualified for the position of Labor Relations
Specialist. This was error, as Coplin demonstrated that he was among the eleven
individuals interviewed for the position. See Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and
Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 523 (3d Cir. 1992) (reiterating that a plaintiff meets his
burden of adducing a prima facie case by showing that he “was sufficiently
qualified to be among those persons from whom a selection, to some extent
discretionary, would be made”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The District Court did not err, however, in concluding that Coplin failed to
show that the Port Authority’s proffered reason for not promoting him was
pretextual. The Court noted, and the record confirms, that the Port Authority
explained that Coplin had not been selected for the position because he had
received the next-to-lowest rating of the eleven candidates who were interviewed.
The Port Authority pointed out that it had awarded the position to a Caucasian
female who had attained the second-highest score during the interview process.
Coplin does not challenge these facts. Instead, he asserts that the District Court
employed the wrong standard. But as we explained above, supra n. 3, the Court
applied the proper standard to his § 1983 claim.
Evans and Coplin also assert that the District Court erred because it failed to
4

apply a mixed motive analysis. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101
(2003). We disagree. A mixed motive case requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that
race was a motivating factor. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at
101. In the absence of a prima facie case of discrimination, or a showing that an
employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its employment actions were
either a post-hoc fabrication or a pretext, there is no inference of discrimination.
See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-08 (1993). Without an
inference that a protected factor played a part in an employer’s action, there is no
basis for a district court to apply a mixed motive analysis.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.
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